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CASE NOTES
cated. A mere glance at the corporate records is all that is needed to ascer-
tain whether the person seeking appraisal and payment is properly entitled
to relief. On the other hand, the registered owner is placed in a position
where he has the power to sever the beneficial owner's interest in the corpora-
tion. Yet it should be borne in mind that this situation results from the
beneficial owner's own act since he assented to the registration of his shares
in the name of another. Furthermore, he will not be left without a remedy
against the registered owner.
To a lesser degree, interpretation (2) is subject to the disadvantages of
interpretations (1) and (3). Under interpretation (2), the simplicity of
interpretation (1) does not exist, since the corporate records will not be the
sole criterion in determining the parties entitled to an appraisal. Also, the
registered owner will still have the power to affect the beneficial owner's
interest. Furthermore, there is the possibility of conflict between the actions
of the beneficial and registered owners. It is submitted, therefore, that inter-
pretation (1) is the preferable view.
MICHAEL 13. SPITZ
Corporations—Judicial Review of Corporate Elections—Section 25 of
the New York General Corporation Law.—Gearing v. Kelly.'—The
appellant, a director of Radium Chemical Company, Inc., stayed away from
a directors' meeting for the sole purpose of preventing a quorum. In her
absence the board of directors elected a new director to fill an existing
vacancy on the board. The Supreme Court, Special Term, 2 granted appel-
lants' petition to the extent of setting aside the election. The Court of
Appeals3
 upheld the Supreme Court, Appellate Division,4 in dismissing the
petition. HELD: Both appellant and the stockholder whom she represented
were estopped to assert that the lack of a quorum invalidated the board's
election of the new director.
Section 27 of the New York General Corporation Law states: 5
Unless otherwise provided a majority of the board at a meeting duly
assembled shall be necessary to constitute a quorum for the trans-
action of business and the act of a majority of the directors present
at such a meeting shall be the act of the board. (Emphasis added.)
Section 27° also gives every corporation the privilege of enacting a by-law
fixing its own quorum requirement at any fraction not less than one-third,
nor more than a majority of its directors.' And although the probability
of a deadlock is enhanced, 8 section 9 of the same act° permits the certificate
1 11 N.Y.2d 201, 182 N.E.2d 391, 227 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1962).
2 29 Misc. 2d 674, 215 N.Y.S.2d 609 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
3
 Supra note 1.
4 15 App. Div. 2d 219, 222 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1961).
5 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 27.
g Ibid.
7 Benintendi v, Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y, 122, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945).
See Henn, Corporations and Other Business Enterprises § 274 (1961).
9
 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 9. The statute provides in detail the manner of effecting,
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of incorporation to include a provision requiring unanimity or greater than
a majority vote to constitute a quorum.
The question of the legality of the election arose from the alleged
absence of a quorum.' q In an early decision," a New York court had held
that the power of a board of directors is not suspended by vacancies in
the board unless the number be reduced below a quorum. The general rule
is that the number necessary and sufficient to constitute a quorum is a
majority of the entire board, notwithstanding that there may be vacancies
in the board at the time. 12 Neither the decision nor the rule, however, was
applied by the Appellate Division in the instant case.
Radium's certificate of incorporation provided for a minimum of four
directors. In 1961 one of these directors resigned, and the meeting in
question was called to fill the resulting vacancy on the board. Since only
two directors actually attended the meeting and voted to fill the vacancy,
a majority of the entire board was not present. It would appear, as a result,
that under ordinary circumstances the action of the board would be a "void
act," 13 regardless of the appellant's motive for staying away from the
meeting. 14 However, the Appellate Division interpreted the by-laws of the
corporation as permitting vacancies on the board to be filled by a majority
of the directors actually in office. 15 Since only three directors were actually
in office two would therefore constitute a majority of the board, and any
action by them would be fully authoritative. The court reached this result
by comparing the section of the by-laws which provided that "a majority
of the directors shall constitute a quorum" with other sections which re-
quired the approval of "a majority of the whole board." From this dis-
tinction between "the board" and "the whole board" the court inferred
that a majority of "the board" meant a majority of the directors actually
in office.' 8
 Further grounds for the decision were derived from the fact
that twenty-one states and the Model Business Corporation Act allow
directors to fill vacancies where less than a quorum remains. 11
 If, as was
decided by the Appellate Division, two directors were a sufficient number
subscribing and acknowledging an amendatory certificate adopting, changing or striking
out such a provision.
1° See Cirrincione v. Polizzi, 14 App. Div. 2d 281, 220 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1961); In re
New York & Westchester Town Site Co., 145 App. Div. 613, 130 N.Y.S. 414 (1911).
11 Castle v. Lewis, 78 N.Y. 131 (1879) ; White, New York Corporations § 188, (12th
ed. 1947).
12 Erie Ry. v. City of Buffalo, 180 N.Y. 192, 197, 73 N.E. 26, 28 (1904).
13 Supra note 10.
14 See Tomlinson v. Loew's Inc., 134 A.2d 518 (Del. Ch. 1957); rearg. denied,
135 A.2d 136 (Del. Ch. 1957), in which a Delaware court in a situation similar to the
present ruled that:
The fact that four directors of the corporation stayed away from a meeting of the
board of directors to prevent a quorum, would not estop directors who stayed
away from the meeting from raising the contention that the election of directors
at a meeting to fill vacancies was invalid because there was no quorum.
Furthermore, the absence of directors from the meeting would not be considered
temporary resignations by them. Since the individual defendants were purportedly
elected at a directors' meeting at which no quorum was present, it follows that
their election was contrary to the governing by-laws and invalid.
15 Supra note 4, at 220, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
10 Id.
17 Supra note 4, at 221, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 477,
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for the purpose of filling vacancies on the board, it would appear that the
vacancy was validly filled. Therefore, the absence of the appellant should
make no difference.
The Appellate Division also held that the appellant-director should be
estopped to complain, since a director should not be allowed to gain personal
advantage through breach of his duty to attend meetings." Furthermore,
the appellant-stockholder was estopped to complain since the stock was
so closely held as to make the director (her daughter) "her" director, and
to show that the two were motivated by identical interests."
The Court of Appeals affirMed the decision of the Appellate Division
in a per curiam opinion which discussed only the issue of estoppel. How-
ever, Judge Froessel dissented strongly, maintaining that two directors
were not sufficient to constitute a quorum and that consequently the election
was wholly void and should be set aside. 2° He also took issue with the
majority's insistence that the appellants should be estopped from complaining
on the grounds that such relief was precluded by the language of the
pertinent sections of the General Corporation Law. 2 '
In holding that the shareholder is estopped from attacking the election,
the Court of Appeals appears to be reaching a conclusion directly in conflict with
In re William Faehndrich, Inc.22 In that case the Court of Appeals held that
an improper purpose on the part of a stockholder provided no grounds for re-
lief under Section 25 of the General Corporation Law 23 where the literal statu-
tory prerequisites for holding an election had been properly complied with.
This was because the purpose of the section was "to provide a summary
review of a contested election, free from the procedural complications of a
plenary proceeding."24 In the instant case the court rests its decision to
18 Id.
19 Supra note 1, at 203, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 898.
20 Supra note 1, at 205, 227 N.Y.S.2d at 899.
21 N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 25.
Upon the application of any member aggrieved by an election, and upon notice
to the persons as the court may direct, the supreme court at a special term
thereof shall forthwith hear the proofs and allegations of the parties and confirm
the election or order a new election as justice may require.
See discussion, infra.
22 In re William Faehndrich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 161 N.Y,S.2d 99 (1957). The
president of a corporation caused a notice to be sent to his father, the secretary and
treasurer of the corporation, advising him of a special meeting of the stockholders
to be held on a stated date "for the purpose of electing directors of the corporation for
the ensuing year, or for such action or further business as may arise at said meeting."
The father failed to attend the meeting. The son voted his shares in favor of himself and
his wife and they were elected directors. They thereupon held a directors' meeting, elected
the son president and treasurer, and his wife vice-president and secretary, thereby
replacing the father as secretary-treasurer. They also terminated the father's employment.
The court at Special Term set aside the election. It was the court's conclusion that the
notice of the meeting was invalid because it did not "carry home" to the petitioner that
it was respondent's "purpose" to remove him as a director, officer and employee of the
corporation. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed without opinion. The Court
of Appeals ruled that "sympathy-provoking though the facts may appear, they afford
no ground for relief under section 25 of the General Corporation Law; the petition should
have been dismissed."
23 Supra note 21.
24 Supra note 22, at 474, 161 N.Y.S,2d at 104.
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estop the shareholder wholly on an examination of the improper motives of
the director, which motives are attributed to the shareholder because of the
close relation existing between them. The court is, in effect, applying the
"clean hands" doctrine. But, in relying on the purpose of the shareholder,
this decision seems to ignore the summary nature of proceedings under
section 25. Such proceedings, by their very nature, should not be concerned
with the motives of the parties, but with whether or not the corporate by-
laws have been complied with. 25
Section 25 provides that the court "shall . . . confirm the election
or order a new election as justice may require." 26 It might be argued that
the statutory phrase, "as justice may require," authorized the court to
grant a different type or a greater measure of relief where the circumstances
of a particular case warrant such a remedy. It has been held, however, that
these words merely modify those specifying the two alternatives open to
the court, namely to confirm or to order a new election." Where it is
intended that a court may vary its relief according to the circumstances of
the election under, review, the state statute usually confers such power. 28
Thus it appears, in light of these factors, that the Court of Appeals, by
holding appellants estopped from attacking the election result, has departed
from the provisions set forth in section 25—"to either confirm the election
or order a new election." If the Court of Appeals had addressed itself
directly to the question of whether or not Radium's quorum requirements
had been fulfilled, the court could have confirmed or set aside the election
solely on that basis, exclusive of the estoppel consideration. Consequently,
it further appears that the Court of Appeals has not only utilized a form
of relief which is not permissible under section 25, but has done so in a
case where such relief is wholly unnecessary.
It is interesting to note that in the new Business Corporation Law of
New York, which will become effective April 1, 1963, section 25 of the
present act has been replaced by section 619 26 which will give the court
the power "(1) to confirm an election, or (2) order a new election, or
(3) to take such other action as justice may require." The addition of
the latter clause to the existing law will enable the court to grant whatever
type of relief is warranted by the circumstances of the contested election,
25
 Supra note 22, at 475, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 105. "It may well be that it would be more
desirable and expedient if the court were empowered in the summary proceeding to pass
on all issues. But that is, of course, a matter for the legislature rather than the courts.
Section 25 of our General Corporation Law, as written and construed, permits the courts
no alternative but to confirm the election or order a new one in summary fashion."
28 Supra note 21.
27
 In re William Faehndrich, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 468, 161 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1957); In the
Matter of Baldwinsville Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 268 App. Div. 414, 51 N.Y,S.2d 816
(1944).
28 See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14:10-16 (Supp. 1954) ... [The court may) establish
the election so complained of, or order a new election, or make such order, and give such
relief in the premises as justice may require; Cal. Corp. Code Ann. § 2238 (West 1955) ....
The court may determine the person entitled to the office of director or may order a new
election to be held or appointment to be made, and direct such other relief as may be
just and proper; Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 225 (1953).
28 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 619.
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with the result that decisions, such as the present one, will henceforth be
above reproach.
PETER N. WELLS
Fair. Trade—McGuire Act—Absolute Prohibition of Resale Price Main-
tenance Agreements between Competitors.—Texas Co. v. DiGaetano. 1—
A bill in equity was brought by the Texas Company against a gasoline
retailer to enjoin the latter from selling Texaco gasoline for less than the
minimum prices established by a resale price maintenance agreement which
was entered into between the company and another of its retailers. 2 The
defendant, though not a party to this agreement, was obligated to comply
with the resale prices agreed upon, once he learned of the agreement, by
virtue of the "non-signer" provisions of the New Jersey Fair Trade statute. 3
The defendant appealed from an order denying his motion to vacate a final
judgment enjoining his "price-cutting" and the Appellate Division of the
Superior Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded the decree of the ,
lower court. HELD: The plaintiff oil company could not compete with the
defendant retailer for business of a type exempted from the plaintiff's price-
resale schedule and at the same time enforce fair trade prices against the
retailer in a non-exempted field.
It is by virtue of the Miller-Tydings amendment of the Sherman Act 4
that state-authorized fair trading of goods moving in interstate commerce
is lawful, and the application of such price-maintenance agreements to "non-
signers" is permitted by the McGuire amendment of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.3 Both of these permissive amendments provide that agree-
ments between "corporations in competition with each other" are expressly
prohibited. The defendant in the instant case contended that since he and
the plaintiff were "in - competition with each other" for commercial and
industrial accounts, it would be unlawful to allow the plaintiff to hold him
to fair trade restrictions on price with respect to sales to privately owned
automobiles.
Plaintiff oil company, perhaps with an eye to the competition provisions
of these amendments, had promulgated a New Jersey fair trade price sched-
ule exempting from fair trade prices "sales made by retailer to ... commer-
cial or industrial concerns or institutional establishments." The schedule
stated that the "primary purpose" of the exemption was to enable the
Texaco retailers to meet the competition of retailers of other brands selling
at lower prices to buses, trucks, tractors and other commercial vehicles.
1 71 N.J. 413, 177 A.2d 273 (1961).
2 The suit was instituted pursuant to the New Jersey Fair Trade Statute. N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 56:4-5 (1940).
3 N.J. Rev. Stat. § 56:4-6 (1940). This statute has been sustained as not violative
of due process. See Lionel Corp. v. Grayson-Robinson Stores, 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 304
(1954).
4 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
5 The Miller-Tydings Act did not have a non-signer provision. The Supreme Court
in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951), had held that
the resale price agreements could not be enforced against non-contracting parties.
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